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CAN WISCONSIN BUSINESSES SAFELY
RELY UPON EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS
TO LIMIT THEIR LIABILITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Exculpatory contracts are found predominantly, but not exclusively,
in the landlord-tenant and participatory venture' contexts. They ex-
empt one party from responsibility for the consequences of his or her
actions.2 Wisconsin businesses rely upon exculpatory contracts to limit
their exposure to lawsuits and reduce the cost of their insurance premi-
ums. In return for the benefits adduced from these agreements, busi-
nesses offer their products or services at a reduced cost to the con-
sumer.3 However, the unpredictable manner in which Wisconsin courts
have assessed the validity of exculpatory agreements4 has jeopardized
businesses' ability to confidently rely upon these agreements.
The absence of legislative parameters governing the use of exculpa-
tory contracts has required Wisconsin courts to assess the validity of
these agreements on a public policy basis. The amorphous nature of
public policy grants courts broad discretion in determining whether spe-
cific exculpatory agreements are valid. It also inhibits businesses' abil-
ity to draft valid agreements. The two concepts are interrelated. Be-
cause courts have exercised their discretion unpredictably, businesses
have been unable to know what is required to survive the court's scru-
tiny. Two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin il-
lustrate this point.
In Yauger v. Skiing Enterprises, Inc.,5 the supreme court held invalid
an exculpatory agreement wherein Michael Yauger acknowledged that
there were "inherent risks in skiing" and agreed to hold the ski area
1. "Participatory ventures" refer to businesses that allow patrons to engage in recrea-
tional activities including but not limited to skiing, motor sports and jetskiing.
2. See Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 656 n.1 (Wis. 1991) (defining exculpatory
contracts as seeking "to release one or more of its parties from at least some liability result-
ing from any negligent act or omission or other wrongful act by that party.").
3. See infra note 141.
4. See infra text and accompanying notes 42-138.
5. 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
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"harmless on account of any injury."6 The court found the agreement
invalid because it failed to define "inherent risks in skiing" and because
the exculpatory provision was not sufficiently identifiable within the
context of the entire agreement.
In Richards v. Richards,' Jerilyn Richards sought authorization from
her husband's employer to accompany her husband on his commercial
trucking run. In exchange for a waiver of liability, the employer granted
its authorization.9 The supreme court held that the exculpatory agree-
ment violated public policy because the agreement was drafted on a
standardized form, serving more than one purpose,' ° and the agree-
ment's language was "broad and all-inclusive.""
This comment focuses on the validity of exculpatory contracts in
Wisconsin and the approach Wisconsin courts have taken in addressing
that issue." Section I discusses the purposes that exculpatory contracts
serve and examines the rationale behind the general rule that exculpa-
tory contracts are not invalid per se. Section II examines whether Wis-
consin has consistently applied its public policy analysis in determining
the validity of particular exculpatory contracts. Section III discusses the
deficiencies of public policy as a means of assessing exculpatory con-
tracts. Finally, Section IV proposes alternatives to the current Wiscon-
sin approach. For businesses that rely upon exculpatory agreements to
limit their liability, these alternatives will provide greater certainty that
their agreements will be upheld.
II. RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE VALIDITY OF EXCULPATORY
CONTRACTS
The term "exculpatory clause" is defined as "[a] contract clause
which releases one of the parties from liability for his or her wrongful
acts." 3 These clauses have been referred to as "hold harmless agree-
6. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Wis. 1996).
7. Id. at 63-64.
8. 513 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1994).
9. Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118,119 (Wis. 1994).
10. The form containing the waiver of liability agreement also included the authoriza-
tion agreement, permitting Jerilyn to accompany her husband. Id
11. Id
12. Wisconsin's approach to determining the validity of exculpatory contracts is not ex-
clusive to Wisconsin. This comment, however, will focus on Wisconsin as representative of
the public policy approach to exculpatory agreements.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990); see also Merten v. Nathan, 321
N.W.2d 173, 176 (Wis. 1982) (defining exculpatory contracts as "contracts which relieve a
party from liability for harm caused by his or her own negligence").
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ments."' 4 While "the law does not favor exculpatory clauses,"'5 they are
not invalid per se.16 The justification for upholding the validity of excul-
patory clauses has been grounded in "the freedom of contract guaran-
teed by the federal and state constitutions."17 Courts have also recog-
nized the applicability of tort principles to transactions in which parties
employ the use of exculpatory clauses."8 Courts assessing the validity of
exculpatory clauses attempt to balance "the tension between the princi-
ples of contract and tort law that are inherent in such [ agreement[s]."' 9
A. Principles of Contract Law
As a justification for the validity of exculpatory clauses, freedom of
contract recognizes that people should be able to transact business
without government intervention.2 Freedom of contract requires that
parties engage in the bargaining process "freely and voluntarily.,
21
When this requirement is satisfied, "[t]he law of contracts protects the
justifiable expectations of individuals who choose to enter into agree-
ments." Almost 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court ar-
ticulated its view concerning the importance of freedom of contract:
If there is one thing which more than another public policy re-
quires it is that men of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their con-
tracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sa-
cred, and shall be enforced by courts of justice .'
This principle weighs in favor of upholding exculpatory agreements
when parties have freely and voluntarily entered into them.
14. Richard J. Lind, Express Contracts of Indemnity, 65 J. KAN. B. ASS'N. 36, 36 (1996)
(distinguishing between exculpatory clauses and indemnity clauses).
15. Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Wis. 1991) (citation omitted). The law
disfavors exculpatory agreements because they excuse "conduct in the given area of activity
or pursuit which conduct is below the acceptable standard of ordinary and reasonable care
applicable to that activity or pursuit." Id
16. 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 297 (1991); see also Dobratz, 468 N.W.2d at 658; Arnold
v. Shawano County Agric. Society, 330 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Wis. 1983), overruled on other
grounds by Green Springs Farm v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1987).
17. Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kaiser, 135 N.W.2d 247,248-49 (Wis. 1965).
I& See, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121-22 (Wis. 1994); see also Arnold,
330 N.W.2d at 777.
19. Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 121.
20. Id at 121.
21. Id.
22. Kellar v. Lloyd, 509 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Merten v. Nathan,
321 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Wis. 1982)).
23. Baltimore & Ohio SW. R.R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498,505 (1900).
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B. Principles of Tort Law
In the context of exculpatory agreements, principles of contract law
collide with principles of tort law. In contrast to the principles of con-
tract law, the principles of tort law militate against upholding exculpa-
tory agreements. Individuals who have been harmed as a result of the
unreasonable conduct of another may obtain compensation under tort
law.' This is predicated on the principle that those responsible for
causing harm through negligent conduct should bear the cost of the
harm and should not be allowed to circumvent this duty through con-
tract .' Holding an actor liable for his negligent conduct also "serves the
'prophylactic' purpose of preventing future harm."" The possibility of
pecuniary loss to a negligent actor provides an incentive to act accord-
ing to a reasonable level of care.Y Consequently, the principles of tort
law reflect a reluctance "to allow parties to shift by contract the burden
of negligent conduct from the actor to the victim who has no actual con-
trol or responsibility for the conduct causing the injury."' The com-
peting principles of contract and tort law must be considered when as-
sessing the validity of exculpatory agreements.
C. Balancing the Principles of Contract Law and Tort Law
When courts are called upon to determine the validity of exculpa-
tory contracts, they balance the principles of contract law against the
principles of tort law. Principles of contract law account for the recog-
nition that exculpatory agreements are not invalid per se.29 On the other
hand, tort principles dictate that exculpatory agreements maintain a dis-
favored position in the law.' Due to the disfavored position of these
agreements, courts construe them strictly against the party seeking to
rely on them.3' When a clause is found to contravene public policy, the
24. Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121-22 (Wis. 1994); see also Kellar, 509
N.W.2d at 94.
25. Discount Fabric House of Racine Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417,418-20
(Wis. 1984).
26. Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 122.
27. Merten, 321 N.W.2d at 177.
2& Discount Fabric, 345 N.W.2d at 420 (quoting Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173,
177 (Wis. 1982)).
29. See Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Wis. 1994).
30. See idt at 121-22.
31. Id at 121; Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 429,432 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994); Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Wis. 1991); Arnold v. Shawano County
Agric. Soc'y, 330 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Wis. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Springs
Farm v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1987).
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clause will be held invalid. While the validity of exculpatory agree-
ments is determined on a case-by-case basis, the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts section 195 provides a number of situations where exculpa-
tory contracts will be held invalid as against public policy." Wisconsin's
adoption of section 195 of the Restatement?3 eliminated some of the un-
certainty surrounding exculpatory contracts. The courts, however, have
preserved their broad discretion by emphasizing that the list laid out in
the Restatement was not exhaustive.' In addition, the unpredictable
manner in which the courts have exercised their discretion has offset the
certainty provided by the Restatement.
Ill. WISCONSIN'S INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
In Wisconsin, exculpatory contracts have been used in varied con-
texts: landlord-tenant relationships,35 horseback-riding lessons,36 race-
tracks, advertising,38 waterski shows, 39 and snow skiing.' In assessing
the validity of exculpatory agreements in these contexts, courts have es-
32. Exculpatory contracts will be held invalid in the following situations:
(1) A term exempting a party from liability for harm caused intentionally or reck-
lessly ....
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently ... if
(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an employee for injury in
the course of his employment;
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to
one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty, or
(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected against the class
to which the first party belongs.
(3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort liability for physical
harm to a user or consumer is unenforceable.., unless the term is fairly bargained
for and is consistent with the policy underlying that liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 195 (1979).
33. For a history of Wisconsin's treatment of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195,
see Yauger v. Skiing Enterprise, Inc., 538 N.W.2d 834, 838-39 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd,
557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
34. See, e.g., Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173,178 (Wis. 1982).
35. Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kaiser, 135 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. 1965).
36. Merten, 321 N.W.2d at 173.
37. Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Kellar v.
Lloyd, 509 N.W.2d 87 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Trainor v. Aztalan Cycle Club, Inc., 432 N.W.2d
626 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); Arnold v. Shawano County Agric. Soc'y, 330 N.W.2d 773 (Wis.
1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816 (Wis.
1987).
38. Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417 (Wis.
1984).
39. Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1991).
40. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
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tablished rules to guide their decision-making process. However, courts
have applied these rules inconsistently. Additionally, at times courts
have ignored these rules altogether, opting instead to craft rules to suit
the particular facts of the case currently before the court.41
A. Active v. Passive Negligence0
In Queen Insurance Co. v. Kaiser,3 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
established the distinction between active and passive negligence as
critical to whether an exculpatory agreement would be upheld. The
court defined active negligence as "some positive act or some failure in
a duty of operation which is the equivalent of a positive act."' Passive
negligence, on the other hand, denotes "the failure to do something that
should have been done."45 The court held that an exculpatory agree-
ment will be ineffective when the injury or damages sustained resulted
from active negligence. 46 Passive negligence, however, will not be suffi-
cient to nullify an otherwise valid exculpatory clause.47
In Queen Insurance, the exculpatory provision was included in an
industrial lease agreement. 4' The lessee's merchandise sustained water
damage caused by a maintenance worker's failure to close the door to
the roof.49 The court considered the negligence passive, and thus held
that the exculpatory clause prohibited the lessee's suit.5°
The supreme court, in College Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v.
41. See infra Section II.B.
42. The active/passive negligence distinction arises most frequently in the landlord-
tenant context. It is, however, not exclusive to any particular factual setting.
43. 135 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. 1965).
44. Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kaiser, 135 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Wis. 1965) (quoting 65 CJ.S.
322, Negligence § 1(e)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. The exculpatory provision read:
Lessor shall not be liable for any damage occasioned by failure to keep said prem-
ises in repair, and shall not be liable for any damage done or occasioned by or from
plumbing, gas, water, steam, or other pipes, or sewerage or the bursting, leaking or
running of any cistern, tank, washstand, watercloset or the waste-pipe in, above,
upon or about said building or premises nor for the damage occasioned by water,
snow or ice being upon or coming through the roof, sky-light, trap door or other-
wise, or for any damage arising from acts or neglect of cotenants or other occupants
of the same building.
Id. at 248.
49. Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kaiser, 135 N.W.2d 247,248 (Wis. 1965).
50. Id. at 250.
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Hoffinann,1 declined to follow precedent concerning the active/passive
negligence distinction. In Hoffmann, Carl Hoffmann (Hoffmann)
rented a mobile home from College Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc.
(College).52 Hoffmann's lease contained a clause wherein College
would "not be responsible for damage to trailers or any other personal
property; nor accidents nor injury to tenants; fire, theft or loss of valu-
ables in or around trailers."53 Hoffmann nonetheless sued College al-
leging personal injury to himself and his family as a result of College's
failure to maintain adequate heating."
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the
breadth of the exculpatory provision violated public policy. In its
analysis, the court rejected the distinction between active and passive
negligence, finding it "somewhat artificial and arbitrary." 56 Rather, the
court held that the validity of exculpatory agreements should be consid-
ered according to the facts and circumstances under which the agree-
ment was negotiated.'
The exile of active and passive negligence, however, was short-lived.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Home Insurance Co.,5s the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals held an exculpatory agreement ineffectual because
the property damage sustained was caused by active negligence. The
facts were similar to those present in Queen Insurance. Charlotte
Kirsch rented a first floor apartment from Manuel Mendez." Kirsch's
lease included a clause that exempted Mendez from liability for damage
caused by the plumbing, gas, water, steam or other pipes.' Nonetheless,
Kirsch's insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, brought suit
after it was required to indemnify Kirsch for losses resulting from water
damage caused by Mendez' failure to properly insulate the vacant air
conditioning sleeve in the Kirsch's apartment.61 The court held that
51. 241 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. 1976).
52. College Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 241 N.W.2d 174, 175 (Wis.
1976).
53. Id.
54. Hoffmann's action arose as a counterclaim after College sued Hoffmann for de-
faulting on the rent and utility payments. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 177.
57. Id.
58. 276 N.W.2d 349 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
59. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 276 N.W.2d 349, 349 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1979).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 350.
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Mendez' failure to insulate the air conditioning sleeve constituted active
negligence, and therefore the exculpatory agreement was ineffectual.'
The court cited Hoffmann in its decision, but did not address that por-
tion of the opinion that had abolished the active/passive negligence dis-
tinction. 3 Consequently, the court did not explain the reasoning for re-
viving the distinction that had been discarded only three years earlier.
The inconsistent application of the active/passive negligence distinc-
tion highlights how muddied the waters are in the area of exculpatory
agreements. In its most recent discussion of that issue, a state court of
appeals noted that the supreme court has shown "little enthusiasm" for
active versus passive negligence as a basis for assessing exculpatory con-
tracts.64 Can businesses confidently read this as the death of active and
passive negligence? Are businesses safe bargaining for a waiver of li-
ability that covers active negligence, or might a reviewing court hold
this ineffectual? Even if the court of appeals's comment on the su-
preme court's current thinking is accurate, this provides little assurance
that the active/passive negligence distinction may not again be revived,
as in State Farm. In short, Wisconsin's treatment of active and passive
negligence offers virtually no guidance to businesses that attempt to
draft exculpatory agreements that will withstand the scrutiny of a re-
viewing court.
B. Creating New Law to Avoid Harsh Results
While the courts have erratically applied the active/passive negli-
gence distinction, they have been even less predictable when they create
new rules and apply these rules to the case currently before the court.
This has frequently been the case when courts have been called upon to
assess the validity of exculpatory agreements related to participatory
ventures. In these cases, where upholding an exculpatory agreement
may lead to harsh results, courts have invented new law to avoid the
harsh results.
Participatory ventures commonly employ exculpatory contracts to
limit liability. Robert Hirshchorn, chairman of the tort and insurance
practice section of the American Bar Association, has recognized that
the validity and fairness of exculpatory contracts is an issue "of national
62. Id. at 352.
63. lId at 351.
64. Trainor v. Aztalan Cycle Club, Inc., 432 N.W.2d 626, 631 n.2 (Wis. Ct App. 1988)
(quoting Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 202 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Wis.
1972)).
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importance for ski areas as well as amusement parks, junior hockey
leagues, school field trip operators and others."65 Wisconsin recognizes
exculpatory contracts as valid in the context of participatory ventures.6
However, when upholding the validity of an exculpatory agreement
would prohibit an action seeking recovery for serious bodily harm or
death, Wisconsin courts have been disinclined to do so.67 Rather, the
courts have seemed willing to craft new rules, distort existing law, or
stretch the limits of common sense in order to strike down exculpatory
contracts in such cases. The following cases illustrate this point.
Richards v. Richards" provides a stark example of how courts have
dealt with exculpatory contracts in an unpredictable manner. The su-
preme court in Richards fashioned new rules and altered existing prin-
ciples concerning exculpatory contracts. The court then proceeded to
hold the exculpatory contract at issue invalid for failure to comport with
these rules.
Richards arose from the following set of facts. In 1990, Monkem
Company (Monkem) hired Leo Richards as an over-the-road truck
driver. 9 Leo requested permission from Monkem to allow his wife,
Jerilyn, to accompany him as a passenger in his truck.7" Monkem did
not object, but required Jerilyn to sign a form entitled "Passenger
Authorization".71 The form was a one page document consisting of two
sections entitled "FULL AND FINAL RELEASE..." and
"PASSENGER INFORMATION." 2 The terms of the release stated
that Jerilyn agreed to
fully and forever release an [sic] discharge the said Monkem
Company, Inc., and all affiliated, associated, or subsidiary com-
65. Wes Smith, Wisconsin Puts Liability Waivers on Slippery Slope-Small Print Can't
Bar Lawsuits, Court Rules, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16,1997, at 1.
66. See, e.g., Kellar v. Lloyd, 509 N.W.2d 87 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
67. See, e.g., Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996) (invalidating ex-
culpatory provision where ten-year-old girl died after colliding with concrete base of ski lift);
see also Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1994) (invalidating exculpatory clause
where woman sustained serious injuries while accompanying her husband on commercial
trucking run); see also Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1991) (invalidating excul-
patory provision where man died participating in ski show; invalidated for vagueness and
ambiguity, rather than public policy grounds). But see Trainor v. Aztalan Cycle Club, Inc.,
432 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding exculpatory provision where motorcycle
racer sustained serious injuries at defendant's racetrack).
68. 513 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1994).
69. Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118,119 (Wis. 1994).
70. lId
71. Id
72- Id. at 120.
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panies, partnerships, individuals or corporations and all other
person, firms, and corporations, and their heirs, administrators,
executors, successors, and assigns from any and all actions,
causes of actions, claim and demands of whatsoever kind or na-
ture on account of any and all known and unknown injuries,
losses, and damages by me/us or my/our property sustained or
received while a passenger in any and all equipment, vehicles, or
while located on any/all Monkem Company, Inc.,/Joplin Hiway,
Inc. property.73
Jerilyn signed the release, as did Leo as driver, and C.L. McCarley as
the representative of Monkem.74 According to the contract, Monkem
granted Jerilyn permission to be a passenger in Leo's truck "starting
6/1/90 and ending 9/1/90." 75
During the period covered by the contract, Jerilyn accompanied Leo
on one of his scheduled trips and was trapped inside the truck after it
overturned.76 She commenced an action against Monkem7 based on her
injuries resulting from the accident.78 The circuit court granted
Monkem's motion for summary judgment, upholding the validity of the
exculpatory contract.79 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's
judgment."
The supreme court, however, determined that a combination of
three factors required the court to find that the form signed by Jerilyn
was unenforceable as against public policy.8' The first factor was that
the form served two functions' and that the functions "were not clearly
identified or distinguished."" The court found troubling the fact that "it
[was] not reasonably clear to the signer of a form entitled 'Passenger
Authorization' that the document would in reality be the passenger's
agreement to release the Company... from liability."'" The court was
73. Id
74. Id. at 121.
75. Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Wis. 1994).
76. Id at 121.
77. Jerilyn's husband, Leo, was also named as a defendant, but the court's opinion dealt
only with Monkem. Id. at 118.
78. Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 121.
79. Id at 119.
80. Richards v. Richards, 499 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (unpublished decision).
81. Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Wis. 1994).
82. The two functions served by the form were: (1) to grant authorization for Jerilyn to
accompany her husband on his commercial trucking route, and (2) to exempt Monkem from
liability. Id at 122.
83. Id.
84. Id
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troubled despite its opinion that the written terms of the form signed by
Jerilyn "clearly state[d] that the document [was] a release of liability."
The court also acknowledged that a signatory has duty to read and un-
derstand the document to be signed.8
The court's discussion of this first concern contains obvious contra-
dictions that the court did not attempt to reconcile. The court opined
that the form did not clearly indicate to the signer that the form was a
release of liability. Yet, the court then indicated that the form did
clearly state that it was a release of liability. The discussion supporting
the court's concern runs afoul of basic common sense.
The second factor contributing to the court's finding that the agree-
ment was against public policy was the "extremely broad and
all-inclusive" nature of the agreement." The fact that the agreement
released not only Monkem, but all its affiliates as well was disconcerting
to the court." The court was also concerned that the release of liability
was not limited to a specific time period 9 and that the agreement pur-
ported to excuse intentional and reckless conduct.'
The third factor concerning the court was that the agreement be-
tween Jerilyn and Monkem was a "standardized agreement."'" The
court held that this type of agreement forecloses the parties' ability to
freely and voluntarily negotiate.9 The combination of these factors re-
sulted in the court's finding that the exculpatory contract was void as
against public policy.93 The court, however, pointed out that none of
these factors alone would necessarily have warranted the invalidation of
the contract.94
85. Id
86. Id
87. Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118,122 (Wis. 1994).
88. Id.
89. Under the court's reading of the agreement, the established time frame applied only
to the authorization, not the release of liability. Id. Such a narrow reading is unnecessary.
Because Jerilyn would have no right to be in her husband's truck beyond the period specified
in the authorization, she would have no cause of action against the trucking company. Logi-
cally, then, the waiver of liability would be governed by the same time frame as the authori-
zation.
90. Id. The agreement is silent concerning reckless or intentional conduct. The court
found that the agreement excused this conduct based on the broad language included in the
release. The court did not need to decide this issue because there were no allegations of ei-
ther intentional or reckless conduct.
91. Id. at 123.
92. Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118,123 (Wis. 1994).
93. Id.
94. Id. (holding that the combination of the three factors tipped the scales in favor of
10911998]
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Richards sends a disturbing message to businesses that commonly
rely upon exculpatory contracts. In Richards, the supreme court ex-
pressed a willingness to create new law and apply it to the case before it.
No Wisconsin court previously had expressed concern over the inclu-
sion of an exculpatory provision within a document that serves dual
purposes. Also, the court for the first time expressed the view that the
use of standardized forms as a method for drafting exculpatory con-
tracts will weigh against the validity of such contracts. Finally, the court
created a new approach to dealing with exculpatory contracts contain-
ing broad provisions. Wisconsin had previously recognized that
"[e]xculpatory agreements that are broad and general in terms will bar
only those claims that are within the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was executed."95 Despite recognizing this general rule," the
Richards court treated the broad provisions as a factor weighing against
the validity of exculpatory contracts.
Businesses that utilize exculpatory contracts should be wary of the
court's "combination" approach created in Richards. The court empha-
sized that "none of these factors alone would necessarily have war-
ranted invalidation of the exculpatory contract." 7 The court apparently
left open the possibility that, in the future, one of these factors may be
sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory contract. However, even where
one factor alone will not invalidate an agreement, the court did not in-
dicate what combination will be required before an exculpatory con-
tract is considered against public policy. May a business confidently
continue to use a standardized form serving dual purposes so long as the
provisions of the agreement are narrowly drawn? May a business use a
standardized form that includes a broad and all-inclusive release so long
as the sole purpose of the form is to provide a release of liability? Will
the court uphold the validity of a broad and all-inclusive exculpatory
contract so long as it serves a single purpose and the form is not
pre-printed? Richards raises, but does not answer these questions.
The most recent Wisconsin case dealing with the validity of an ex-
culpatory contract in the participatory venture context is Yauger v.
tort principles to compensate injured persons over contract principles to protect freedom of
contract).
95. Arnold v. Shawano County Agric. Soc'y, 330 N.W.2d 773,778 (Wis. 1983), overruled
on other grounds by Green Springs Farm v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1987) (citations
omitted).
96. Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 127.
97. lit at 123 (emphasis added).
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Skiing Enterprises, Inc.93 The agreement at issue in Yauger involved
nearly identical concerns to those present in Richards. Disappointingly,
however, Yauger failed to clear up the uncertainty surrounding the
manner in which Wisconsin determines the validity of exculpatory con-
tact.
In Yauger, Michael Yauger purchased a family ski pass at Hidden
Valley Ski Area for the 1992-93 season." Hidden Valley required
Yauger to fill out an application in order to receive the season pass.
The one-page application required Yauger to identify the names, ages
and relationship of the family members to be covered by the pass." °
Additionally, the application included a prohibition on resale, pertinent
rules of the ski area, penalties for violation of those rules, and an excul-
patory clause."' The exculpatory clause provided that "[t]here are cer-
tain inherent risks in skiing and that we agree to hold Hidden Valley Ski
Area/Skiing Enterprises Inc. harmless on account of any injury incurred
by me or my family member on the Hidden Valley Ski Area prem-
ises. ' Ia Michael Yauger's signature indicated his adoption of that
statement.
On March 7, 1993, Michael's daughter, Tara, was killed after collid-
ing with the concrete base of the chair lift while skiing at Hidden Val-
ley.103 Although the accident occurred within the time frame covered by
the exculpatory contract and Tara was included on the season pass ap-
plication, Michael and his wife, Brenda, commenced an action against
Hidden Valley." a The suit alleged that Hidden Valley negligently failed
to provide proper padding at the base of the chair lift.05 The circuit
court held that the exculpatory contract barred the Yaugers' action and
granted summary judgment for Hidden Valley.
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment, uphold-
ing the validity of the exculpatory contract."° The exculpatory contract
at issue contained each of the factors found to be problematic in Rich-
ards: the broad nature of the agreement, the use of a standardized form,
98. 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
99. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Wis. 1996).
100. Id. at 66 (reprint of the application).
101. I&
102. I& at 61.
103. I&
104. Id.
105. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Wis. 1996).
106. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 538 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 557
N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
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and the dual purposes served by the form.3 7 Nonetheless, the court of
appeals held the agreement valid. Hidden Valley's inclusion of the ex-
culpatory clause on a form that served another purpose did not greatly
concern the court1 O' Rather, the court pointed out that the clause was
set off in an individual paragraph. The court emphasized that "[a]ny
break in the text requires the reader to pause and thus provides a mo-
ment for reflection."'O' Furthermore, the court did not perceive the
situation as one in which Hidden Valley attempted to trick season pass
holders into signing away their rights.Y1
The court also was not significantly troubled by the broad language
contained in the exculpatory clause. The court rejected Yauger's argu-
ment that the clause's broad language rendered the clause ambiguous."1
After noting that broad language will not necessarily render a clause
ambiguous, the court found that the language plain and simply de-
scribed "the risks that arise whenever one's skis are in contact with the
slopes .,,.
Finally, Hidden Valley's decision to use a standardized form to ob-
tain waivers of liability from participants was a non-issue for the court.
The court recognized that the Richards court found the use of a stan-
dardized form troubling, but did not comment on the form of the waiver
in this case."' The court held that the aforementioned factors did not
individually require the court to find the exculpatory clause invalid.11 4
Nor did the combination of the factors, as in Richards, necessitate such
a result. 5
The supreme court, however, reversed the court of appeals, finding
that the exculpatory clause violated public policy and was therefore in-
effectual."6 After reviewing Wisconsin case law on point, the court de-
lineated two applicable principles: a waiver of liability "must clearly,
unambiguously, and unmistakably inform the signer of what is being
107. Compare Yauger, 538 N.W.2d at 838-40, with Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d
118, 122-23 (Wis. 1994).
108. Yauger, 538 N.W.2d at 839.
109. Id at 840.
110. Id
111. Id at 839 (citing Wilke v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 323 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1982)).
112. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 538 N.W.2d 834, 839-40 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd,
557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
113. Id at 839.
114. Id at 840.
115. Idt
116. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1996).
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waived" and "the form, looked at in its entirety, must alert the signer to
the nature and significance of what is being signed." ' 7 The Hidden
Valley application failed under both principles.
Addressing the first principle, the court held that the use of the term
"inherent risks in skiing" did not clearly inform the signer of what was
being waived.' The court pointed to differences between jurisdictions
concerning the definition of "inherent risks in skiing.""' 9 Based on this
difference, the court reasoned, "[i]f judges disagree on the meaning of
the term 'inherent risks,' how can this court infer that a reasonable per-
son would understand what rights he or she was signing away?"' 0 Ac-
cordingly, Hidden Valley's failure to articulate whether its negligence
was one of the inherent risks of skiing invalidated the clause.
The exculpatory clause at issue in Yauger also failed to comport
with the second principle-requiring the form to "clearly and unequivo-
cally communicate to the signer the nature and significance of the
document being signed.",2' The court held that there was nothing con-
spicuous about the manner in which the exculpatory clause was written
that would make it stand out from the rest of the form.'2 The court de-
termined that setting the clause out in an individual paragraph was in-
sufficient to alert the signer to the nature and significance of the waiver
at the time of execution." However, the court did provide suggestions
as to what may suffice to put a signer on notice."
117. Ia at 63.
118. Id. at 63-64.
119. Id. In support of its position that the phrase "inherent risks of skiing" is ambigu-
ous, the court pointed to the definitions assigned that phrase by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey and the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id New Jersey defined the phrase as "those
risks that 'cannot be removed through the exercise of due care if the sport is to be enjoyed."'
I& at 63 (quoting Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 677 A.2d 705, 715 (NJ. 1996)).
Michigan interpreted inherent risks of skiing to "include natural conditions and 'types of
equipment that are inherent parts of a ski area, such as lift towers."' 1d. at 63-64 (quoting
Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp., 428 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)). I disagree
with the court' opinion that these definitions are sufficiently different to support the proposi-
tion that judges have been unable to agree on the definition of "inherent risks of skiing" and
afortiori the phrase is ambiguous.
120. Yauger, 557 N.W.2d at 64
121. Id-
122. Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60,64 (Wis. 1996).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 64-65 n.2 (suggesting using larger print size, using different color print, pref-
erably red, italicizing or boldfacing the waiver and refraining from the use of legal jargon).
For further discussion of suggestions for conspicuousness, see Stephanie J. Greer & Hurlie
H. Collier, The Conspicuousness Requirement" Litigating and Drafting Contractual Indemnity
Provisions in Texas After Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 35 S. TEx. L. REv.
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IV. DEFICIENCIES OF THE WISCONSIN APPROACH
Richards and Yauger demonstrate the unpredictability of the court's
public policy approach in determining the validity of exculpatory con-
tracts. In both cases, the circuit court and the court of appeals scruti-
nized the respective exculpatory clauses and determined that neither
clause violated public policy. The supreme court, however, reversed in
both instances, finding the clauses void as against public policy after en-
gaging in the same analysis as the lower courts. In Yauger, the court
posed the question, "[i]f judges disagree on the meaning of the term
'inherent risks,' how can this court infer that a reasonable person would
understand what rights he or she was signing away?"' ' Wisconsin busi-
nesses familiar with the court's treatment of exculpatory contracts
should be asking themselves-if judges disagree on whether an exculpa-
tory contract is valid, can a reasonable business safely rely upon excul-
patory contracts to limit its liability?'2
Richards and Yauger send a duplicitous message to businesses that
commonly use exculpatory contracts. On one hand, these cases provide
some guideposts that weigh in favor of upholding the validity of excul-
patory agreements. While none of these are dispositive, businesses are
put on notice that using standardized forms, using multi-purpose forms,
including broad provisions,"2 and failing to define certain termsm will
potentially expose an exculpatory agreement to invalidation. By pro-
viding guideposts, these decisions assist businesses in drafting exculpa-
tory contracts that will survive the courts' scrutiny.
On the other hand, Richards and Yauger stand for a much different
proposition. The supreme court in these cases displayed its willingness
to "invent new 'rules' without precedent or support". 29 The court for
the first time in Richards expressed its displeasure with the use of stan-
243,265-70 (1994).
125. Yauger, 557 N.W.2d at 64.
126. For reaction to the supreme court's decision in Yauger, see generally Wes Smith,
Wisconsin Puts Liability Waivers on Slippery Slope-Small Print Can't Bar Lawsuits, Court
Rules, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1997, at 1, and Steven Walters, Ski Hill Operator Sees Ruling as
Peril to Industry-Court Orders Trial Over Negligence Suit in 1993 Skiing Death, MIL-
WAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec. 20, 1996, at 4B.
127. See Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Wis. 1994).
128. See Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60,63-64 (Wis. 1996).
129. Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 124 (Day, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Day criti-
cized the majority's combination of factors as a justification for holding the exculpatory pro-
vision invalid. Justice Day also criticized each individual factor relied upon by the majority.
See generally iL at 124-133 (Day, J., dissenting).
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dardized m and multi-purpose formsY' The court also created new law
regarding broadly written provisions and how they would be handled 2
In Yauger, the court altered the existing rules."' Consequently, exculpa-
tory contracts that comport with the existing guideposts may yet be in-
validated by a new public policy rule invented by the court and applied
to the case before it.
Richards and Yauger accentuate the deficiencies of Wisconsin's
public policy approach in determining the validity of exculpatory con-
tracts. Public policy has been recognized as "a broad, not easily defined
concept... [that] embodies the community common sense and common
conscience. Public policy is 'that principle of law under which freedom
of contract or private dealings is restricted by law for the good of the
community."' '  However, the subjective nature of courts' post hoc
analysis affords parties to exculpatory contracts little opportunity to
know if their private dealings run afoul the communal good. This con-
flicts with the notion that the law be should be defined "with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is pro-
hibited."'35 This notion is expressed in the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
While the doctrine is not applicable in the context of determining the
validity of exculpatory agreements,36 the principles behind it are. Suffi-
cient definiteness in the law allows ordinary people to act in a manner
130. Wisconsin courts had previously encountered exculpatory agreements drafted on
standardized forms without taking issue with the form. See, e.g., Arnold v. Shawano County
Agric. Soc'y, 330 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms
v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1987). In support of the argument that standardized forms
further public policy see Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 129-32 (Day, J., dissenting).
131. Wisconsin courts had previously encountered exculpatory provisions drafted on
multi-purpose forms without taking issue with the form. See, e.g., College Mobile Park
Home & Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 241 N.W.2d 174, 174-75 (Wis. 1976) (providing the rules
under the lease and waiver of liability on the same form).
132. The rule prior to Richards had been that "[e]xculpatory agreements that are broad
and general in terms will bar only those claims that are within the contemplation of the par-
ties when the contract was executed." Arnold, 330 N.W.2d at 778. The Richards court, how-
ever, determined that the broad and general language included in the exculpatory agreement
should militate against upholding the agrepment. Richards, 513 N.W.2d at 123.
133. See Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60,64 (Wis. 1996) (holding invalid an
exculpatory contract that failed to "unequivocally communicate to the signer the nature and
significance of the document being signed"). Id. at 64.
134. Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 421
(Wis. 1984) (citations omitted) (citing Higgins v. McFarland, 86 S.E.2d 168,172 (Va. 1955)).
135. Kolander v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983).
136. The requirements of the void-for-vagueness doctrine apply exclusively to penal
statutes. Id
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that conforms with the law."w Sufficient definiteness, furthermore, dis-
courages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.13
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE WISCONSIN APPROACH
The uncertainty surrounding whether reviewing courts will uphold
the validity of exculpatory agreements has caused great concern to op-
erators of public attractions in Wisconsin.39 Businesses rely upon ex-
culpatory contracts to avoid paying higher insurance premiums and
limit their exposure to lawsuits that are ubiquitous in today's litigious
society."4° However, under the current approach taken by Wisconsin
courts, businesses cannot safely rely upon these agreements. One re-
sponse businesses may adopt to deal with this problem is to make ex-
culpatory agreements available, but not mandatory, for participation.
A lower rate would then be charged to those who opt to execute an ex-
culpatory agreement. This reduced price would reflect the savings to
the business, in the form of limited exposure14' and lower insurance
premiums, generated by the exculpatory agreement. Furthermore, this
arrangement would be grounded upon the principle of freedom of con-
tract, the principle upon which the validity of exculpatory contracts
rests. Rather than participation hinging on a customer's willingness to
sign an exculpatory agreement, a customer would be free to decide
whether to enter into such an agreement. Both parties would receive
pecuniary benefits from such an agreement.
This response, however, may not alleviate the problem. Under this
approach, exculpatory contracts would still be subject to invalidation as
against public policy.
The better approach is legislative action. One route the legislature
could take would be simply to prohibit the use of exculpatory con-
tracts. 142 While this approach would provide certainty, the cost to busi-
137. Id
138. Id
139. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 65.
140. In 1995, 10,500 lawsuits were filed in Wisconsin alleging personal injury or prop-
erty damage. An additional 17,300 lawsuits were filed in the areas of contracts and real es-
tate. Telephone interview with Robert Brick, staff for the Director of State Courts (Feb. 21,
1997).
141. See Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kaiser, 135 N.W.2d 247,249 (Wis. 1965) (recognizing
that tenant received a lower rent in return for waiver of liability); see also Yauger v. Skiing
Enter., Inc., 538 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing that plaintiff received
discounted skiing in return for releasing defendant from liability).
142. As late as 1982, the Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the broad ques-
tion of whether exculpatory contracts were valid remained open. Merten v. Nathan, 321
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nesses would be greater liability exposure and higher insurance premi-
ums. Rather than bear these costs, businesses would likely pass these
costs onto the consumer. This approach may nevertheless adversely af-
fect businesses if escalating costs kept patrons away.
Another route the legislature could take would be to codify re-
quirements for the use of exculpatory contracts. Courts have disin-
genuously stated that exculpatory contracts cannot be evaluated
through a mechanical approach. However, there are objective criterion
that emerge from the case law. Codification of these criteria would
provide greater certainty to those businesses that utilize exculpatory
contracts. For example, legislation may include such things as: (1) a
prohibition against the inclusion of exculpatory agreements on multi-
purpose forms;143 (2) a requirement that the term "negligence" explicitly
appear in the contact in order to exempt a business for liability for its
own negligence;' (3) a requirement that the exculpatory provision be
separately signed; 45 or (4) a requirement that exculpatory provisions
must be drafted in bold or italicized print."
Codifying these technical aspects would not preclude a reviewing
court from invalidating an exculpatory agreement that contravenes
public policy. Codification, however, would reduce the number of ar-
rows contained within the public policy quiver, and deny reviewing
courts unfettered discretion in the area of exculpatory contracts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public policy as a means of assessing the validity of exculpatory con-
tracts has proven inadequate. It deposits too much discretion in the
courts and provides too little guidance to businesses seeking to rely
upon exculpatory agreements to limit their liability. Courts have exer-
cised their discretion in an unpredictable manner, vacillating in their
application of established rules and demonstrating a willingness to cre-
ate new rules that apply retroactively. Legislative rules governing the
validity of exculpatory contracts would be preferable to the current ap-
proach. Legislation would continue to protect individuals from un-
knowingly signing away valuable rights, and at the same time provide
N.W.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Wis. 1982).
143. See Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118,122 (Wis. 1994).
144. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508-09 (Tex.
1993) (applying the "express negligence doctrine").
145. See Yauger v. Skiing Enter., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60,64 (Wis. 1996).
146. See id. at 64 n.2.
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certainty to businesses that rely upon exculpatory contracts. Under the
current public policy approach, the individual is protected with busi-
nesses bearing the cost.
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